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Abstract
This study constructs a firm-level measure of large foreign ownership (LFO) and inves-
tigates its impact on stock return volatility in 31 emerging markets. We find a negative
relationship between LFO and volatility, even after controlling for potential endogeneity
and the impact of major domestic shareholders. This suggests a stabilizing role of LFO
in emerging markets, which is consistent with previous suggestions in the literature on
the strong commitments and potential monitoring role of large foreign shareholders. Over-
all, our study highlights the importance of recognizing the heterogeneity among foreign
investors and the benefits of large foreign shareholders to emerging stock markets.
I. Introduction
Stock market liberalization is one of the most important policy decisions of
an emerging economy. It often involves opening or increasing the exposure of a
domestic stock market to foreign investors. Both theoretical models and empirical
evidence have highlighted significant benefits of liberalization, including the at-
traction of foreign capital to finance economic growth, the development of local
stock markets, and the reduction of cost of capital through risk sharing between
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domestic and foreign investors.1 However, past financial crises in emerging
economies have also led to grave concerns about the potentially destabilizing im-
pact of opening domestic capital markets to cross-border capital flows. Foreign
investors were widely blamed by the financial media for the severity of the capi-
tal flight out of crisis countries, which further amplified financial asset volatility
and worsened the crises. In the development economics literature, Stiglitz (1999),
(2000) also suggests that premature capital market liberalization, which occurs
without the support of well-functioning institutions and appropriate regulations,
can make an emerging economy vulnerable to financial crises.
The potential impact of foreign investment on domestic stock return volatil-
ity is thus a primary concern during the liberalization process. Empirical evidence
on this relationship has so far remained mixed. On the one hand, Bekaert and
Harvey (1997), Kim and Singal (2000), and Umutlu, Akdeniz, and Altay-Salih
(2010) find no significant increase or decrease in volatility following a liberaliza-
tion event or in response to time variations in foreign investment openness, which
to some extent reflects the risk-sharing benefit created by the entry of foreign
investors to local markets. On the other hand, Bae, Chan, and Ng (2004) doc-
ument a positive relationship between foreign investment restrictions and local
firm stock return volatility. They argue that when a local firm is highly accessi-
ble to foreign investors, its stock trading is subject to international investment
flows, and therefore their stock returns are more vulnerable to world market
risk.
To some extent, this contrasting evidence reflects the difficulty in measur-
ing the effects of opening local capital markets. In particular, studies that em-
ploy the event-study approach (e.g., Bekaert and Harvey (1997), (2000), Kim
and Singal (2000), and Henry (2000)) face the problem that liberalization is a
gradual process and is often confounded by other parallel domestic economic re-
forms. Other studies employ indices that measure the openness of an economy to
foreign capital inflows and restrictions to foreign equity ownership (e.g., Quinn
(1997), Edison and Warnock (2003), Bae et al. (2004), and Umutlu et al. (2010)).
However, such indices only reflect the upper limit rather than the actual extent
of foreign investment. None of these studies differentiates short-term, speculative
investors from long-term, strategic investors. Stiglitz (1999), (2000) notes that
foreign investors with large and direct investments are relatively stable sharehold-
ers, but their roles are often overshadowed by the disproportionate attention of the
financial media to the mobility of foreign portfolio investments during the recent
crises.
This paper constructs a measure of actual large foreign ownership (LFO)
and utilizes both its cross-sectional and cross-time variations to study the impact
of large foreign shareholders on stock return volatility in 31 emerging markets.
1Theoretically, international asset pricing models such as those discussed in Errunza and Losq
(1985), Eun and Janakiramanan (1986), and Bekaert and Harvey (1995) show that liberalization
reduces the cost of equity capital. Empirical evidence on this and other benefits of liberalization is
documented in studies such as Bekaert and Harvey (1997), (2000), Kim and Singal (2000), Henry
(2000), (2003), Chari and Henry (2004), Bae, Bailey, and Mao (2006), Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad,
and Siegel (2007), Gupta and Yuan (2009), and so on.
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A firm’s LFO is specified by the aggregate shareholding of foreign investors who
each own 5% or more of the issued shares. We identify these large foreign share-
holders for each of our sample firms to construct the LFO measure for 2002
and 2006. To our knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the actual
ownership pattern of large foreign shareholders across countries in the market lib-
eralization and other relevant literature, instead of relying on foreign investment
limits or liberalization dates as in previous studies.
Through different analyses of both cross-sectional and cross-time variations,
in this paper we find a significantly negative relationship between LFO and stock
return volatility at the firm level. This remains robust even after controlling for
firm-level foreign investment restrictions and the ownership of different types of
large domestic shareholders. We address meticulously the possibility that LFO
decisions may not be exogenous. That is, compared to their domestic counterparts,
foreign investors face additional cross-border investment risks, and hence may
seek to alleviate risk by specifically targeting firms with inherent characteristics
associated with lower volatility. We address the potential endogeneity issue by
first using instrumental variables (IVs) in the estimation of the LFO-volatility
regression. This approach involves tracing back the history of a firm to identify
and classify the type of its original owner in order to construct an instrument
that is as exogenous as possible. Second, we utilize time variations in the 2002–
2006 period to test whether changes in LFO influence changes in volatility. Third,
we conduct an event study to investigate whether volatility declines (increases)
following a block purchase (sale) by a foreign investor. These different approaches
all lead to the same robust conclusion. The negative relationship between LFO
and volatility is unlikely to be driven entirely by their correlation with common
unobservable firm factors, and LFO appears to have a causal impact on volatility.
Economically, this implies that large foreign shareholders play a stabilizing role
in emerging stock markets.
At first glance, our results appear to be opposite to those reported in Bae et al.
(2004), who find that volatility is positively related to foreign investment open-
ness. However, upon closer inspection, the implications of our and Bae et al.’s
(2004) findings are not contradictory, as our LFO variable and the openness mea-
sure used in Bae et al. (2004) (i.e., the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) Emerging Mar-
kets Investibility index) capture different aspects of the spectrum of foreign in-
vestors. The latter is constructed to incorporate both regulatory constraints (upper
limits of aggregate foreign holdings) and practical barriers (firm size and liquidity)
to foreign investments. We argue that foreign portfolio investors, who value the
mobility of their capital, are most affected by these barriers. In contrast, our LFO
variable directly measures the actual ownership of large foreign shareholders, who
invest on a more strategic and long-term basis and are less affected by changes
to these barriers. The correlation between our LFO variable and the investibility
index is statistically and economically insignificant, which explains why the for-
mer may be negatively related to volatility, while the latter is not. Therefore, our
results highlight the importance of recognizing the heterogeneity among foreign
investors.
Our results are corroborated by evidence from Wang (2007), who documents
a stabilizing effect of foreign investors in Indonesia and Thailand during the 1997
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Asian financial crisis.2 He interprets this finding according to Merton’s (1987)
model, which implies that broadening the investor base of a firm can create a risk-
sharing effect, and ultimately, lower stock return volatility. While our findings also
echo the broad implications of Merton’s model, our focus on large foreign share-
holders is unique among extant studies of emerging market volatility. We offer two
additional arguments with some supporting evidence on the volatility-reduction
impact of large foreign shareholders beyond the risk-sharing and investor-base
broadening hypotheses.
First, this effect mirrors the well-recognized stabilizing role of foreign direct
investment (FDI) in developing countries. Stiglitz (2000), for example, criticizes
the speculative nature of portfolio investment, but notes that with regard to eco-
nomic stability, “the argument for FDI . . . is compelling.” He argues that FDI
investors provide not only monetary capital but also other resources, such as tech-
nologies, business relationships, access to new export markets, and training of
human capital.3 Hence, they tend to have strong commitments to their invest-
ments that can translate into operational and financial support of local firms to
help them weather external risk.4 In this study we argue that large foreign share-
holders are similarly committed to their investments, and their large shareholdings
provide a strong incentive to reduce volatility.5 While we do not have direct ev-
idence on how large foreign shareholder commitments shore up local firms, we
are able to show some indirect support for the previous argument. We find that
the negative relationship between LFO and volatility is most observable when
large foreign shareholders are nonfinancial firms or those holding controlling
interests.
Second, the negative relationship between LFO and firm-level volatility may
also reflect a potential monitoring role played by large foreign shareholders. These
investors demand greater transparency, higher accountability of management, and
less risk taking, all of which can result in lower return volatility. Stulz (1999),
(2005) and Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) argue that foreign investors provide
emerging market firms with the tools and incentives to improve corporate gover-
nance. This is supported by evidence that operating results tend to improve after
local firms become accessible to foreign investors (Mitton (2006)) and that firm
performance measures are positively associated with shareholdings of foreign
2Similarly, Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999) do not find any destabilizing effect of foreign investors
before and during the 1997 Asian financial crisis using data from Korea.
3See Blomstro¨m and Kokko (1998) for a literature review on the externalities associated with FDI
and Aitken and Harrison (1999) for firm-level evidence of the positive impact of FDI on foreign-owned
operations.
4During the Asian financial crisis, while net foreign portfolio flows in 5 crisis countries (Indone-
sia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand) decreased from $32.5 billion in 1996 to
–$4.4 billion in 1998, net FDI flows actually increased from $13.9 billion to $14.5 billion (source:
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics). Also refer to Blalock, Gertler, and
Levine (2005) for evidence of how FDI supported and shielded foreign-owned Indonesian firms from
the liquidity crunch during the Asian financial crisis.
5Another related possibility is that because of the support from large foreign shareholders, local
firms can rely less on debt financing, which would otherwise generate stock return volatility. For
example, Mitton (2006) finds that firms accessible to foreign investors have significantly lower
leverage.
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institutional investors (Ferreira and Matos (2008)).6 In this study, the focus on
large foreign shareholders means that we examine a group of foreign investors
with strong incentives to monitor. We hypothesize that if the relationship between
LFO and volatility is related to their monitoring, then it should differ across mon-
itoring environments. Our results show that volatility is significantly lower for
firms with large foreign shareholders, particularly in emerging markets with rel-
atively strong corporate governance, and the volatility-LFO relationship is weak
when shareholder monitoring is likely to be ineffective. Overall, our findings im-
ply that for an emerging market economy, stock market liberalization would be
most beneficial if it is paralleled by significant corporate governance reforms.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the
data and the summary statistics. Section III investigates the relationship between
LFO and volatility and then reports other main findings. Section IV concludes the
paper.
II. Data and Descriptive Statistics
A. Descriptions of the Sample of Emerging Market Firms
To construct our sample, we consider all firms in 31 emerging markets
covered by the S&P Emerging Markets database in 2002. These firms are the con-
stituents of the S&P/IFCG (Global) index (and the S&P/IFCI (Investible) index),
which is a popular benchmark for funds investing in emerging markets. They are
selected as the most liquid firms that on aggregate account for 60% to 75% of the
total capitalization of each market. We collect information on the sample firms
for 2 years (2002 and 2006) that are sufficiently far apart to capture meaning-
ful changes in ownership concentration. This allows us to examine the relation-
ship between LFO and volatility based upon both cross-sectional and cross-time
variations.
An important reason for using the S&P Emerging Markets database to con-
struct our sample is that it accounts for the practical and legal barriers to foreign
investments through its investibility index. This index is constructed to reflect le-
gal and practical restrictions to foreign ownership. In particular, each market is
assessed on whether there are constraints on the ability of foreign institutions to
invest in local firms and to repatriate returns. Individual firms are also assessed
to determine whether there are corporate bylaws or industrywide restrictions on
foreign ownership. To capture the practical barriers, the S&P Emerging Markets
database defines small and illiquid stocks as noninvestible.7 It then creates a vari-
able called the “degree open factor” or “investible weight,” which ranges from
6Some other studies also show that governance environments and monitoring ability play an im-
portant role in determining cross-border acquisitions and fixed investments (Rossi and Volpin (2004),
Kelley and Woidtke (2006)), as well as international investment allocation (Dahlquist, Pinkowitz,
Stulz, and Williamson (2003), Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005), and Leuz, Lins, and Warnock (2009)).
7These criteria vary at the discretion of S&P’s Index Committee. For example, in 2002 the size
criterion was a minimum investible capitalization of $50 million, and the liquidity criterion was a
minimum trading volume of $20 million during the prior year, with trading on at least 1/2 of the local
exchange’s trading days. In 2007 these 2 criteria were specified at $100 million and $50 million,
respectively.
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0 to 1 and indicates the proportion of a firm’s shares that foreign investors may
legally and practically own.
We use data from the S&P Emerging Markets database to calculate firm-
level stock return volatility and other firm-level control variables such as size
and trading turnover. There are two known problems associated with the data
(Rouwenhorst (1999)). The first is the survivorship bias due to the selection of
stocks based on size and liquidity criteria, which are probably correlated with
past performance. As explained in Bae et al. (2004), this is irrelevant to studies
(including ours) that do not seek to explain performance over time. The second
problem is the existence of unreasonable figures in the database. We follow the
procedure used in Bae et al. (2004) to deal with dubious return and volume obser-
vations. Our analysis also employs leverage as another control variable, obtained
from the Osiris, Worldscope, and S&P GlobalVantage databases. However, we
are not able to match exhaustively all S&P Emerging Markets firms to the other
databases. Thus, taking into account inactive and unmatched firms, and those with
no ownership information (see the later discussion), our sample comprises 1,409
firms.
B. Identification of Large Foreign Shareholders
To measure the LFO variable, we rely on the ownership data from Li,
Moshirian, Pham, and Zein (2006), who assemble large block shareholdings data
in 2002 for firms from 45 countries. This ownership database is constructed using
data from Osiris (from Bureau Van Dijk), Worldscope (from Thomson Reuters),
and supplementary sources within Lexis/Nexis.8 By merging the S&P Emerging
Markets database with that of Li et al., we are able to obtain shareholder names
and percentage shareholdings for most domestic firms in our sample. For firms
not covered by Li et al., we collect their ownership information from their annual
reports (if available) using the Mergent Online database. We then extend the sam-
ple of Li et al. by applying the same methodology to obtain ownership information
for 2006.
We define LFO as the sum of foreign block shareholdings. A block is de-
fined as an ownership stake of at least 5% of issued shares (this threshold is later
increased to 20% in our robustness checks). A foreign shareholder is defined as
a citizen of another country, a business entity registered (or headquartered) in
another country, or an unlisted majority-owned subsidiary of a foreign company.
We follow a detailed procedure to identify a foreign block shareholder. In
summary, this procedure involves checking manually the origin of the ultimate
owner of each blockholder. Using several company information databases (Osiris,
Bureau Van Dijk’s Company Directory Service, Lexis/Nexis, and Dun and
Bradstreet’s Who Owns Whom), the financial press (through Factiva and
ProQuest), the Google search engine, company Web sites, and annual reports,
we trace the ownership chain to identify the ultimate owner behind each block-
holder. In addition, we match detailed subsidiaries data from the Osiris database
with our database to identify whether an emerging market firm in our sample is
8See Li et al. (2006) for a more detailed description of the ownership data collection process.
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a partly owned subsidiary of a foreign corporation. For a small number of block-
holders, whose origins cannot be identified, we classify whether they are foreign
investors based on their countries of registration information available in Osiris,
except in cases where they are registered in tax havens.9
C. Variables
We examine the relationship between LFO and stock return volatility in a
cross-sectional regression framework. Similar to Bae et al. (2004), we calculate
the dependent variable, the stock return volatility in 2002 and 2006 (adjusted for
dividends and stock-splits), by taking a logarithmic transformation of squared
monthly returns for each year and averaging this measure for the year.10,11
Our main LFO variable is calculated as the sum of foreign block share-
holdings, where a block is defined as a holding larger than or equal to 5% of a
firm’s issued shares. This variable is labeled as LFO5PCT. This 5% benchmark for
large shareholdings is later raised to 20% to construct an alternative LFO mea-
sure (LFO20PCT). For the robust analysis, we also construct another LFO measure
(LFO5TO20PCT) that incorporates foreign shareholdings larger than or equal to 5%
and less than 20% of a firm’s issued shares. Further, we split the main LFO vari-
able into ownership from financial institutions (LFOFIN) and nonfinancial enti-
ties (LFONONFIN). To facilitate a comparison between our LFO measure and the
foreign investibility factor created by the S&P Emerging Markets database,we
include the latter as a control variable (INVESTIBILITY).
While our main focus is to test whether large foreign shareholdings are as-
sociated with lower volatility, it is possible that this relationship can be observed
across all types of large shareholders, foreign and domestic alike. All large share-
holders are likely to be long-term investors and may refrain from active stock
market trading. The resulting lack of free-float shares may lead to lower volatil-
ity. It is also possible that any observed relationship between LFO and volatility is
simply a result of foreign investors not being able to acquire large shareholdings
in firms with already concentrated ownership. In emerging markets, these firms
may exhibit higher volatility due to the added risk of potential expropriation (Bae,
Kang, and Kim (2002), Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002)).
To address these issues, we control for measures of domestic ownership con-
centration. In particular, DOMFIN, CROSSHOLD, and DOMNONFIN are the
aggregate percentage ownership of domestic financial institutions (e.g., banks,
insurance companies, mutual funds, pension funds, and so on), of other domes-
tic corporations, and of all nonfinancial domestic entities, respectively. It should
9We exercise extreme caution when dealing with holding entities registered in tax havens. In such
cases, we rely on other sources such as the firms’ annual reports, statements of beneficial sharehold-
ings, and the financial press to identify the ultimate owners. For those holding companies whose real
owners cannot be identified, we follow a conservative approach and do not include them as foreign
shareholders.
10Our main findings remain robust when volatility is measured using standard deviation of returns.
11We multiply monthly returns by 100 before the transformation for ease-of-reporting purposes.
Nontrading months, in which 0 trading volume is recorded, are excluded from the calculation. Our
main findings remain robust when we use an alternative volatility measure that does not exclude the
nontrading months.
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be noted that we single out institutional block shareholders (the 1st category)
because they may influence volatility through another channel. That is, they may
act as outside monitors, possibly in a way that can reduce volatility. Crosshold-
ings by other domestic corporations (CROSSHOLD) are another important cate-
gory to examine separately, as they may form a conduit for volatility contagion
within a market. We construct DOMFIN and DOMNONFIN using our own own-
ership data, whereas CROSSHOLD is obtained from the S&P Emerging Markets
database. Note that although CROSSHOLD and DOMNONFIN are collected
from different sources, there is a significant degree of overlap between these
2 variables, and they are used as alternative controls in the regression.
We then follow previous studies on the cross-sectional determinants of stock
return volatility to identify other necessary control variables in the regression.
In particular, size and trading turnover are the 2 main control variables used in
Bae et al. (2004). Large firms are often associated with lower volatility, and we
measure size using the average of the natural logarithm of month-end market
capitalization (LogMKTCAP) in 2002 and 2006. Trading turnover is included,
as active trading also generates high volatility. This variable (TURNOVER) is
measured as the average of the number of shares traded in a month scaled by the
number of shares outstanding for 2002 and 2006. We also follow Wei and Zhang
(2006) to include 2 other important determinants of volatility, that is, leverage
and lagged volatility. Highly leveraged firms are expected to be more volatile,
and we control for this by using the ratio of total liabilities to total assets reported
for 2002 and 2006 (LEVERAGE). The 1-year lag of volatility (LagVOL) is also
included in the model, as it is well known that return volatility is autocorrelated.
The specification of our regression model is
(1) Vi, j = α + β′ LFOi, j + δ′Zi, j + εi, j,
where Vi, j denotes the volatility of firm i in country j, measured as the annual
average of the logarithm of squared monthly returns in 2002 or 2006; LFOi, j
stands for 1 (or 2) of the main explanatory variables, LFO5PCT, LFO5TO20PCT,
LFO20PCT, LFOFIN, and LFONONFIN; and Zi, j represents all the firm-level control
variables. To control for industrywide differences in volatility, we include in the
control variables a set of indicator variables (excluding one) that corresponds to
10 broad sectors defined by the Global Industry Classification System (GICS).
Finally, our regression model also includes a set of dummy variables for all
sample countries (excluding one). These country fixed effects capture the homo-
geneity across firms in the same country that exists due to its laws, regulations,
governance environments, economic conditions, and stages of financial develop-
ment. These factors can affect the relationship between foreign investment and
volatility, but they are difficult to measure explicitly. In addition, all inferences
from the regression are based on standard errors that are adjusted for country-
cluster heteroskedasticity (see Petersen (2009)).
D. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the main variables used in this
study. There are in total 31 countries spanning Asia, Europe, Latin America,
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TABLE 1
Summary Statistics of the Sample
For each country, Panel A of Table 1 reports the within-country average of volatility measures (logarithm of squared returns), investibility (proportion of issued shares that can be legally and practically held by
foreign investors), LFO5PCT (the aggregate percentage ownership of all large foreign shareholders, using the 5% ownership threshold), LFO20PCT (an alternative LFO measure calculated using the 20% ownership
threshold), and LFOFIN and LFONONFIN (the aggregate large ownership held by foreign ﬁnancial institutions and nonﬁnancial ﬁrms, respectively). DOMFIN (DOMNONFIN) is the aggregate block shareholdings
of domestic ﬁnancial institutions (all nonﬁnancial domestic entities). Panel A also reports the within-country median of ﬁrm size (monthly average of market capitalization), trading turnover (monthly average of the
number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding), and leverage (total liabilities divided by total assets). The numbers in Panel A are calculated by averaging the 2002 and 2006 statistics of
each sample ﬁrm before aggregating to the country level.
No. of Log of Median Median Median
Firms Squared Size Turnover Leverage Investibility LFO5PCT LFO20PCT LFOFIN LFONONFIN DOMFIN DOMNONFIN
Country (2002) Returns (US$ mil.) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Panel A. Summary Statistics for Individual Countries
Argentina 20 4.129 275.61 3.187 58.565 36.578 42.272 39.011 2.131 37.424 0.225 15.463
Bahrain 11 1.293 192.49 0.339 78.097 0.000 19.395 9.105 9.541 9.855 6.091 22.007
Brazil 50 3.391 946.20 3.153 57.111 50.933 17.102 15.164 0.689 15.735 4.537 40.062
Chile 37 2.329 935.84 0.992 52.404 41.786 21.626 18.389 1.786 19.854 1.556 36.393
China 204 3.340 336.11 11.249 53.945 14.445 1.310 0.148 0.692 0.579 0.827 44.231
Colombia 12 2.933 915.55 0.791 49.009 0.000 13.720 10.234 2.478 11.242 0.292 42.473
Czech Rep. 15 2.704 360.44 2.662 41.717 16.366 27.590 26.944 1.356 26.234 4.370 40.102
Egypt 30 2.834 128.97 1.726 62.435 19.942 11.999 9.157 0.267 11.732 3.035 41.743
Hungary 17 2.835 181.43 4.335 39.997 40.776 32.803 24.252 4.691 28.103 2.074 22.296
India 121 3.404 569.17 5.800 54.048 18.287 12.687 10.456 2.108 10.554 4.416 29.878
Indonesia 55 3.130 123.01 2.861 59.229 17.844 18.290 12.344 4.641 13.295 0.055 38.474
Israel 45 3.194 640.73 4.083 67.091 51.878 7.761 4.452 2.853 4.908 3.311 38.655
Jordan 23 2.582 163.92 1.836 61.986 0.000 11.005 7.708 2.859 8.408 7.287 27.071
Korea 102 3.691 760.15 18.973 64.055 71.294 6.925 2.623 3.224 3.454 2.901 23.142
Malaysia 119 2.764 389.97 1.781 49.109 38.796 6.715 5.467 0.664 6.030 5.379 35.900
Mexico 52 3.065 968.91 1.455 58.812 48.440 12.217 9.668 2.446 9.876 0.499 43.255
Morocco 18 2.294 486.80 0.990 40.859 28.633 25.594 21.261 2.674 22.213 7.394 41.392
Nigeria 15 1.566 153.97 0.803 86.936 0.000 11.664 11.307 0.000 11.664 0.167 18.628
Oman 13 2.329 60.67 1.280 49.431 0.000 6.560 4.004 0.775 5.785 5.208 27.651
Pakistan 36 3.548 195.62 12.056 58.619 0.000 14.701 11.803 1.511 13.190 3.751 30.377
Peru 21 2.984 277.24 0.827 41.204 21.134 22.300 19.620 0.650 21.404 1.240 34.639
Philippines 53 3.250 229.20 1.280 57.019 10.482 6.623 3.678 1.997 4.604 1.237 44.133
Poland 26 3.446 399.48 2.352 52.736 42.666 36.096 29.643 5.999 29.716 4.183 19.094
Russia 16 3.518 8,298.00 2.657 34.252 34.987 4.421 2.323 1.157 3.264 4.173 49.369
Slovakia 7 1.877 67.42 5.088 56.058 0.000 35.156 31.679 0.464 34.692 0.000 36.606
South Africa 67 3.184 1,185.28 4.526 56.222 71.621 8.907 6.446 2.211 6.307 12.223 25.733
Sri Lanka 40 2.809 20.96 1.566 66.905 0.000 22.263 16.355 3.262 18.872 3.438 31.460
(continued on next page)
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TABLE 1 (continued)
Summary Statistics of the Sample
No. of Log of Median Median Median
Firms Squared Size Turnover Leverage Investibility LFO5PCT LFO20PCT LFOFIN LFONONFIN DOMFIN DOMNONFIN
Country (2002) Returns (US$ mil.) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Taiwan 94 3.591 932.45 17.485 53.148 57.332 2.014 0.722 1.216 0.798 1.110 18.128
Thailand 57 3.363 340.34 6.845 67.165 21.198 13.077 9.502 2.614 10.377 1.346 30.567
Turkey 22 3.679 124.61 17.815 43.802 29.333 18.158 16.737 0.000 18.044 0.000 42.061
Venezuela 11 3.314 156.48 0.530 49.567 0.000 16.453 14.898 0.383 16.070 2.662 27.265
Country avg. 2.980 671.52 4.559 55.533 25.315 16.368 13.068 2.172 14.009 3.064 32.847
Panel B. Descriptive Statistics for the Entire Sample for 2002 (N = 1,409)
Mean 3.290 822.08 10.875 58.533 31.383 11.340 8.708 1.601 9.655 2.964 37.093
Median 3.365 243.86 3.511 56.330 24.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 36.450
Max 9.209 4.1×104 683.609 500.000 100.000 99.210 99.210 55.000 99.210 53.450 99.920
Min –2.768 1.46 0.000 0.118 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Std. dev. 1.189 2,201.62 29.488 35.091 34.366 21.912 21.021 5.330 21.173 8.138 26.106
Panel C. Descriptive Statistics for the Entire Sample for 2006 (N = 1,300)
Mean 3.068 2,240.67 9.386 58.820 31.709 11.491 8.601 2.265 9.024 3.046 29.783
Median 3.136 545.27 4.844 56.738 24.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 25.000
Max 6.050 2.0×105 274.343 500.000 100.000 98.000 98.000 54.000 98.000 58.000 99.000
Min –5.226 1.11 0.000 2.238 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Std. dev. 1.079 7,660.70 15.098 37.522 34.085 22.154 21.190 6.101 21.379 7.884 23.449
Panel D. Descriptive Statistics for Changes in the Variables from 2002 to 2006 (N = 1,300)
Mean –0.230 1,533.21 –1.238 0.222 0.532 1.504 1.095 0.829 0.550 0.082 –7.459
Median –0.236 245.028 0.367 –0.173 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 –3.770
Max 4.880 1.8×106 247.346 459.171 100.000 97.000 97.000 44.140 97.000 47.000 99.000
Min –8.344 –1.8×105 –662.986 –375.323 –100.000 –88.590 –88.590 –55.000 –88.590 –53.450 –90.920
Std. dev. 1.385 6,442.16 28.167 29.906 22.786 11.848 12.227 5.500 12.210 7.509 20.968
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Africa, and the Middle East. The number of stocks in each country ranges from
7 in Slovakia to 204 in China. To arrive at the country-specific statistics for each
variable (in Panel A), we first take the average of the values for each firm in both
2002 and 2006, then report its country-level average. Due to the high level of
within-country skewness of the size, trading turnover, and leverage measures, we
report the country-level median instead for these variables. We also report the
summary statistics of the variables across the entire sample separately for 2002
and 2006.
There are large variations in average volatility across countries. It is worth
noting that Argentina, South Korea, Turkey, and Taiwan, which are relatively
larger and more developed economies in the sample, actually record the high-
est level of volatility in 2002 and 2006, while countries with the lowest level of
volatility are small economies such as Bahrain, Nigeria, Slovakia, and Morocco.
All in all, stock returns of firms in the S&P Emerging Markets database are not
more volatile than those in developed markets. For example, in 2002 and 2006,
the medians of our volatility measure for the entire sample are 3.37 and 3.14 (see
Panels B and C of Table 1), respectively, whereas the medians of the same mea-
sure for all firms in 23 developed markets covered by Datastream are 3.36 and
3.05, respectively.
We further examine the summary statistics of the potential determinants of
volatility. Although our sample firms are listed in emerging markets, they are not
necessarily small firms. Their median market capitalization is US$243.86 million
in 2002 and US$545.27 million in 2006 (see Panels B and C of Table 1). In com-
parison, the median market capitalization of all firms in 23 developed markets
covered by Datastream is approximately US$111 million for 2002 and US$82
million for 2006. Panel A of Table 1 also shows that emerging market firms on
average are not overburdened with debt. The average of the within-country me-
dian leverage level is 55.53%. Liquidity appears to be the only characteristic that
distinguishes emerging from developed markets. With the exception of China,
Korea, Pakistan, Taiwan, and Turkey, all emerging markets have a within-country
median trading turnover (average of 2002 and 2006) of less than 10% per month,
and the cross-country average of this figure is 4.56%. Again, using Datastream
data, we find that the cross-country average of trading turnover for the 23 devel-
oped markets is much higher, at approximately 8% in the same period.
We observe substantial variations in LFO statistics across countries. Based
on the LFO5PCT variable, China has the lowest level of LFO (1.31%), reflect-
ing its use of different share classes to restrict foreign shareholdings. In contrast,
transition economies such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia
have very high average LFO statistics, reflecting their willingness to attract FDI
and their geographic proximity to the developed economies (and large sources of
funds) in Western Europe.
There is no detectable correlation between the LFO and volatility statistics
at the country level. Differences in volatility across countries appear to be driven
mainly by country-specific factors unrelated to foreign investment. For example,
in 2002, Argentina and Brazil are the countries with the highest volatility mea-
sures. This corresponds to large currency fluctuations in both Argentina and Brazil
over the same period. However, a closer look at our data shows that high-LFO
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firms in these countries appear to better withstand macroeconomic and political
shocks. In a separate calculation based on the average of 2002 and 2006 volatil-
ity values (not reported in the table), firms with above-median LFO have lower
median volatility (3.85 in Argentina and 3.17 in Brazil) than those with below-
median LFO (4.14 and 3.62, respectively). This is consistent with our expectation
that LFO may have an influence on stock return volatility at the firm level, and
appears to be resistant to volatility shocks at the country level. A disaggregation
of the LFO variable further indicates that cut-and-run activities may be difficult
for large foreign shareholders. As reflected by the high average LFO20PCT and
LFONONFIN statistics, the majority of large foreign shareholders are nonfinan-
cial entities (which tend to invest more than just monetary capital) and those
that hold a (potentially controlling) ownership stake of at least 20% of shares
outstanding.
E. Comparison of LFO and Investibility
The S&P Emerging Markets database’s investibility index has been a pop-
ular measure of foreign investment restrictions in emerging markets (Edison and
Warnock (2003), Bae et al. (2004), Chari and Henry (2004), and Mitton (2006)).
It indicates the maximum percentage of a firm’s issued shares that can be owned
by foreign investors, subject to the database’s size and liquidity screening criteria.
In this section, we investigate the differences between LFO and the investibility
index to highlight the contributions of our findings to the existing literature.
To clarify their differences, we split our sample according to the average
of a firm’s monthly investible weights in 2002 and 2006. Following Bae et al.
(2004), firms are classified as noninvestible if their investibility index values are
0, as partially investible if their investibility index values range from 0 to 0.5, and
as highly investible if their investibility index values are higher than 0.5. Table
1 reports that there are quite a few countries in which all firms can be classified
as noninvestible, namely Bahrain, Colombia, Jordan, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan,
Slovakia, Sri Lanka, and Venezuela, but they do have local firms partially owned
by large foreign shareholders, according to our ownership information. This sug-
gests a substantial difference between LFO and investibility as measures of for-
eign investments.
It should be noted that LFO measures the actual presence of large foreign
shareholders in a domestic firm, whereas investibility is based on the upper limit
of the percentage ownership held by foreign investors, regardless of whether and
how much they actually invest in the company. Thus, a firm may be fully or highly
investible, but it has no or low LFO. Panel A of Table 2 reports that such firms
make up around 20% of our sample. This implies that easing foreign investment
restrictions does not necessarily attract LFO. In addition, the investibility index
does not account for many natural barriers to foreign investments, such as the
ownership of domestic controlling shareholders. Their tight control reduces the
extent of free-float shares available to foreign investors.
In contrast, a noninvestible firm can still be invested in by large foreign share-
holders. Panel B of Table 2 reports that there are around 4% of the sample firms
whose actual aggregate large foreign shareholdings are greater than 50% but the
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TABLE 2
LFO versus Investibility: Country-Level Summary
Investibility is obtained from the S&P Emerging Markets database and is deﬁned as the proportion of the issued shares
that can be legally and practically held by foreign investors. A large foreign shareholding is an ownership stake of at least
5% of a ﬁrm’s issued shares held by a foreign investor.
% of Firms % of Firms
No. of Firms in Each Country in Entire Sample
Country 2002 2006 2002 2006 2002 2006
Panel A. Highly Investible Firms without Any Large Foreign Shareholdings
Argentina 1 1 5.000 5.556 0.071 0.077
Brazil 18 15 36.000 32.609 1.278 1.152
Chile 7 6 18.919 17.647 0.497 0.461
China 21 13 10.294 6.500 1.490 0.998
Egypt 1 4 3.333 15.385 0.071 0.307
Hungary 4 2 23.529 15.385 0.284 0.154
Indonesia 3 2 5.455 3.636 0.213 0.154
Israel 14 12 31.111 27.273 0.994 0.922
Korea 52 39 50.980 40.625 3.691 2.995
Malaysia 32 33 26.891 29.464 2.271 2.535
Mexico 14 9 26.923 20.930 0.994 0.691
Morocco 2 1 11.111 6.250 0.142 0.077
Peru 2 3 9.524 14.286 0.142 0.230
Poland 3 3 11.538 13.043 0.213 0.230
Russia 4 2 25.000 12.500 0.284 0.154
South Africa 42 34 62.687 60.714 2.981 2.611
Taiwan 69 66 73.404 73.333 4.897 5.069
Turkey 2 2 9.091 9.091 0.142 0.154
Total 291 247 20.655 18.971
Panel B. Noninvestible Firms with Aggregate Large Foreign Shareholdings of at Least 50%
Argentina 5 4 25.000 22.222 0.355 0.307
Bahrain 1 2 9.091 25.000 0.071 0.154
Chile 2 2 5.405 5.882 0.142 0.154
Colombia 0 2 0.000 20.000 0.000 0.154
Czech Republic 1 1 6.667 14.286 0.071 0.077
Egypt 1 0 3.333 0.000 0.071 0.000
Hungary 3 1 17.647 7.692 0.213 0.077
India 4 6 3.306 5.263 0.284 0.461
Indonesia 4 1 7.273 1.818 0.284 0.077
Jordan 1 2 4.348 11.765 0.071 0.154
Malaysia 4 4 3.361 3.571 0.284 0.307
Morocco 2 0 11.111 0.000 0.142 0.000
Nigeria 2 3 13.333 33.333 0.142 0.230
Pakistan 4 7 11.111 19.444 0.284 0.538
Peru 4 4 19.048 19.048 0.284 0.307
Philippines 1 1 1.887 1.887 0.071 0.077
Poland 1 1 3.846 4.348 0.071 0.077
Slovakia 2 2 28.571 100.000 0.142 0.154
Sri Lanka 9 9 22.500 22.500 0.639 0.691
Thailand 1 1 1.754 1.887 0.071 0.077
Turkey 1 4 4.545 18.182 0.071 0.307
Venezuela 1 3 9.091 27.273 0.071 0.230
Total 54 60 3.833 4.608
investibility indices for these firms are 0. There are two possible reasons for such
a mismatch. First, some of these firms do have large foreign shareholders but do
not pass the size and liquidity tests as specified by the S&P Emerging Markets
database to be classified as investible. Second, some firms are owned by locally
registered entities, which are actually wholly owned subsidiaries or joint ventures
of foreign entities. In some countries, this arrangement may bypass foreign in-
vestment regulations as interpreted and recorded by the S&P Emerging Markets
database, whereas our manual classification still allows us to identify these firms
as having large foreign shareholders.
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III. Analysis of Results
A. Baseline Regression Results on the Relationship between
LFO and Volatility
Table 3 reports the country fixed-effects regression results of volatility on
LFO, with the dependent variable being volatility measured in 2002 (in
Panel A) or 2006 (in Panel B). We find that the coefficients of LFO5PCT are nega-
tive and statistically significant in all regression specifications, for both 2002 and
2006. Thus, large foreign shareholdings are found to be associated with lower
stock return volatility. The economic significance of this relationship is quite
strong. For example, in Column (4) of Panel A, which reports the results of our full
regression model for 2002 volatility, the coefficient of LFO5PCT is –0.474. This
implies that a 10% increase in LFO is expected to reduce the range of monthly
stock price changes by 2.34% from its median level, if other factors remain con-
stant.
TABLE 3
The Relationship between Volatility and LFO (firm-level baseline regression results)
The dependent variable is the average of a logarithmic transformation of monthly squared returns. LFO5PCT is the aggre-
gate percentage ownership of foreign investors with a block (≥ 5%) shareholding. INVESTIBILITY is obtained from the
S&P Emerging Markets database, which deﬁnes this variable as the proportion of the issued shares (ranging from 0 to 1)
that can be legally and practically held by foreign investors. DOMFIN (DOMNONFIN) is the aggregate block shareholdings
of domestic ﬁnancial institutions (all nonﬁnancial domestic entities). CROSSHOLD is the percentage of issued shares of a
sample ﬁrm held by other domestic corporations. LogMKTCAP is the average of the monthly natural logarithm of market
capitalization. TURNOVER is the average of the number of shares traded in a month divided by the number of shares
outstanding at the beginning of the month. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. All regressions include
(but we do not report) industry dummy variables and country ﬁxed effects. Cluster-adjusted standard errors are reported
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Dependent Variable Panel B. Dependent Variable
Is 2002 Volatility Is 2006 Volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LFO5PCT –0.535*** –0.542*** –0.385* –0.474** –0.573*** –0.600*** –0.439*** –0.569***
(0.167) (0.184) (0.217) (0.173) (0.133) (0.130) (0.151) (0.124)
INVESTIBILITY 0.198 0.212 0.114 0.095 0.074 0.080
(0.259) (0.232) (0.290) (0.183) (0.155) (0.158)
DOMFIN –0.314 –0.164 –0.294 –0.610 –0.541 –0.395
(0.326) (0.290) (0.299) (0.375) (0.374) (0.315)
CROSSHOLD 0.026 0.122 0.112 0.135
(0.166) (0.159) (0.200) (0.192)
DOMNONFIN 0.214 0.258**
(0.153) (0.115)
LogMKTCAP –0.097** –0.101** –0.104** –0.068 –0.110** –0.116** –0.116** –0.100***
(0.045) (0.047) (0.045) (0.044) (0.043) (0.045) (0.046) (0.034)
TURNOVER 0.419* 0.412* 0.426* 0.317 1.362*** 1.363*** 1.381*** 1.040***
(0.235) (0.230) (0.232) (0.196) (0.179) (0.180) (0.183) (0.185)
LEVERAGE 0.318*** 0.324*** 0.333*** 0.274*** 0.138* 0.147* 0.154* 0.065
(0.073) (0.074) (0.073) (0.081) (0.074) (0.075) (0.077) (0.059)
LagVOL 0.281*** 0.258***
(0.045) (0.049)
Adjusted R2 0.326 0.327 0.328 0.370 0.217 0.217 0.219 0.276
No. of obs. 1,409 1,409 1,409 1,364 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300
We investigate the differences between LFO and investibility further by
examining jointly their effects on stock return volatility. Across all regression
Li, Nguyen, Pham, and Wei 1141
models in Table 3 that include INVESTIBILITY, the coefficients of this variable
are all insignificant, whereas the significance and explanatory power of the
LFO5PCT variable remain the same. In contrast, utilizing a panel data set covering
an earlier period (1989–2000),12 Bae et al. (2004) document a positive relation-
ship between investibility and volatility. Once again, these contrasting findings
indicate that our LFO measure and the investibility measure constructed by the
S&P Emerging Markets database capture different foreign ownership elements.
In particular, the findings in Bae et al. (2004) may be driven by foreign portfo-
lio investors being sensitive to the intertemporal changes in the investibility of
emerging market firms that occur due to new restrictions/regulations, and im-
provements/degradations in firm size and liquidity.
Incorporating the alternative measures of large domestic shareholdings, we
find that the LFO5PCT variable remains significant in all regressions. Block share-
holdings by domestic institutions (DOMFIN) have a negative impact on volatility,
whereas shareholdings of domestic corporations (CROSSHOLD) and all nonfi-
nancial blockholders (DOMNONFIN) actually have a positive impact. However,
the coefficients of these variables are mostly insignificant. This reflects that in
emerging markets, concentrated ownership is widespread and common to all firms
with different risk profiles. Large (controlling) domestic blockholders are likely to
be original owners/founders, and it is unlikely that they tend to set up their firms to
be inherently low risk (or high risk). Overall, the significant relationship between
LFO and volatility is unlikely to be spuriously driven by their negative correlation
with the extent of large domestic shareholdings. Among different types of block-
holders, only the presence of foreign blockholders is strongly associated with a
volatility-reduction effect.
The regression results also justify the inclusion of important determinants of
volatility, as their coefficients are mostly significant. Consistent with our expec-
tations, volatility is significantly higher in small, high-turnover, and highly lever-
aged firms. All regressions include (but do not report the coefficients of) industry
indicators and country fixed effects, which explain a large proportion of cross-
sectional variations in volatility. Further, the inclusion of the control variables
does not alter the significance and direction of the LFO variables. Overall, this
relationship cannot simply be attributed to systematic differences in country-level
environments or to previously identified firm-level determinants of volatility.13
B. Alternative Definitions of LFO
We next attempt to pinpoint the types of large foreign shareholders that
bring the largest volatility-reduction effect. This provides insights into whether
12Bekaert et al. (2007) also show that most of the equity market liberalization events and opening
of banking sector events in emerging markets are concentrated in the earlier part of this period.
13This relationship also remains robust when we exclude foreign shareholders from neighboring
countries and countries in the same region from our LFO calculation, or when we replace our 2002
and 2006 volatility measures with their 1-year leads. We also retest our basic specification (Models 1
and 5 of Table 3) over individual countries that have more than 30 firms, and over subsamples of other
countries grouped by their regions. The negative relationship between LFO and volatility holds for the
majority of these subsamples.
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the commitment of a large shareholding is one of the underlying economic
channels through which foreign investors can reduce volatility. In the develop-
ment economics literature, Stiglitz (2000) clearly distinguishes (short-term) port-
folio investment flows from (long-term) FDIs, which bring not only financial
resources, but also technology, access to markets, and training of human capital.
As such commitments create a physical barrier to any quick exit, foreign direct in-
vestors are likely to have a strong incentive to reduce the risk of their investments.
Although FDI is not the focus of our study, all arguments related to commit-
ments of FDI are also likely to apply to investments by large foreign shareholders.
To further highlight the role of commitments, we reestimate the regression mod-
els of Table 3 using other alternative definitions of LFO that reflect different sizes
and types of large foreign shareholders.
First, we consider the foreign shareholders who hold a (potentially control-
ling) ownership stake of at least 20% of shares outstanding. The so-defined LFO
variable is labeled LFO20PCT. The results are reported in Table 4. Again, this
TABLE 4
The Relationship between Volatility and Alternative LFO Measures Classified According
to Sizes of Large Foreign Shareholders (firm-level regression results)
The dependent variable is the average of a logarithmic transformation of monthly squared returns. LFO5TO20PCT
(LFO20PCT) is the aggregate percentage ownership of foreign investors who each own 5% to less than 20% (more than
20%) of issued shares. INVESTIBILITY is obtained from the S&P Emerging Markets database, which deﬁnes this variable
as the proportion of the issued shares (ranging from 0 to 1) that can be legally and practically held by foreign investors.
DOMFIN (DOMNONFIN) is the aggregate block shareholdings of domestic ﬁnancial institutions (all nonﬁnancial domestic
entities). CROSSHOLD is the percentage of issued shares of a sample ﬁrm held by other domestic corporations. LogMKT-
CAP is the average of the monthly natural logarithm of market capitalization. TURNOVER is the average of the number of
shares traded in a month divided by the number of shares outstanding at the beginning of the month. LEVERAGE is the
ratio of total liabilities to total assets. LagVOL is the lagged dependent variable. All regressions include (but we do not
report) industry dummy variables and country ﬁxed effects. Cluster-adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses.
***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Dependent Variable Panel B. Dependent Variable
Is 2002 Volatility Is 2006 Volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LFO5TO20PCT –0.027 0.071 –0.096 0.027
(0.436) (0.460) (0.384) (0.379)
LFO20PCT –0.519*** –0.366* –0.584*** –0.417***
(0.174) (0.204) (0.107) (0.124)
INVESTIBILITY 0.103 0.065 0.066 0.033
(0.290) (0.259) (0.160) (0.127)
DOMFIN –0.300 –0.176 –0.410 –0.337
(0.297) (0.277) (0.317) (0.322)
CROSSHOLD 0.141 0.140
(0.161) (0.192)
DOMNONFIN 0.182 0.263**
(0.158) (0.107)
LogMKTCAP –0.069 –0.066 –0.102*** –0.101***
(0.044) (0.042) (0.033) (0.034)
TURNOVER 0.319* 0.336* 1.045*** 1.061***
(0.178) (0.200) (0.184) (0.181)
LEVERAGE 0.273*** 0.278*** 0.064 0.071
(0.080) (0.079) (0.059) (0.060)
LagVOL 0.280*** 0.279*** 0.258*** 0.257***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.049) (0.048)
Adjusted R2 0.370 0.370 0.276 0.277
No. of obs. 1,364 1,364 1,300 1,300
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LFO variable is negatively and significantly related to volatility. In comparison,
the LFO5TO20 variable, which aggregates foreign ownership stakes ranging from
5% to 20%, is insignificant in all regression specifications. Thus, the volatility-
reduction effect is most observable among foreign investors who are likely to
have a strong commitment to their investments, that is, those with a potential
controlling stake.
Second, we split LFO into 2 groups according to whether a foreign share-
holder is a financial institution (LFOFIN) or a nonfinancial entity (LFONONFIN).
The former category includes banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, pen-
sion funds, and other investment entities. The latter category includes all other
foreign blockholders. While foreign institutions do have large shareholdings (see
Table 1), their interests are likely to differ from those of nonfinancial entities
(mainly multinational firms), whose investments are more likely to be long term
and may extend beyond financial interests. The results associated with this cate-
gorization are reported in Table 5. We find that the coefficients of LFONONFIN are
TABLE 5
The Relationship between Volatility and Alternative LFO Measures Classified According
to Types of Large Foreign Shareholders (firm-level regression results)
The dependent variable is the average of a logarithmic transformation of monthly squared returns. LFOFIN (LFONONFIN)
is the aggregate percentage ownership of foreign investors who each own more than 5% of issued shares and is also
a ﬁnancial institution (nonﬁnancial entity). INVESTIBILITY is obtained from the S&P Emerging Markets database, which
deﬁnes this variable as the proportion of the issued shares (ranging from 0 to 1) that can be legally and practically held
by foreign investors. DOMFIN (DOMNONFIN) is the aggregate block shareholdings of domestic ﬁnancial institutions (all
nonﬁnancial domestic entities). CROSSHOLD is the percentage of issued shares of a sample ﬁrm held by other domestic
corporations. LogMKTCAP is the average of the monthly natural logarithm of market capitalization. TURNOVER is the
average of the number of shares traded in a month divided by the number of shares outstanding at the beginning of the
month. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. LagVOL is the lagged dependent variable. All regressions
include (but we do not report) industry dummy variables and country ﬁxed effects. Cluster-adjusted standard errors are
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Dependent Variable Panel B. Dependent Variable
Is 2002 Volatility Is 2006 Volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LFOFIN 0.500 0.586 –0.287 –0.159
(0.415) (0.441) (0.377) (0.373)
LFONONFIN –0.581*** –0.438* –0.601*** –0.439***
(0.182) (0.225) (0.121) (0.138)
INVESTIBILITY 0.100 0.052 0.073 0.037
(0.290) (0.259) (0.159) (0.125)
DOMFIN –0.324 –0.210 –0.406 –0.337
(0.297) (0.276) (0.314) (0.318)
CROSSHOLD 0.160 0.142
(0.165) (0.195)
DOMNONFIN 0.165 0.248**
(0.160) (0.107)
LogMKTCAP –0.070* –0.069* –0.101*** –0.100***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.034) (0.034)
TURNOVER 0.322 0.327 1.042*** 1.056***
(0.200) (0.203) (0.185) (0.182)
LEVERAGE 0.276*** 0.279*** 0.065 0.071
(0.081) (0.080) (0.059) (0.060)
LagVOL 0.282*** 0.280*** 0.259*** 0.258***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.049) (0.048)
Adjusted R2 0.372 0.372 0.276 0.278
No. of obs. 1,364 1,364 1,300 1,300
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consistently negative and significant. In contrast, the coefficients of LFOFIN are
insignificant. This indicates that nonfinancial large foreign shareholders, who
are potentially more committed, play a stabilizing role, while the foreign finan-
cial institutions group does not. Overall, the findings reported in both Tables 4
and 5 further emphasize the importance of recognizing the heterogeneity of for-
eign investors and the need to treat them differently in studies of cross-border
investments.
C. Endogeneity
As with other studies on the effects of financial liberalization, our study faces
a potential endogeneity problem. More specifically, is the investment decision by
large foreign investors exogenous to stock return volatility, or do they consciously
avoid inherently risky firms?
The foreign investment literature suggests that volatility may influence
portfolio allocation of foreign investors, although the evidence appears mixed.
For example, Kang and Stulz (1997) find that foreign investors in Japan overallo-
cate their portfolios to firms with low unsystematic risk. Dahlquist and Robertsson
(2001), on the other hand, report that percentage ownership held by foreign in-
vestors is not significantly related to either beta or idiosyncratic volatility, after
controlling for other firm characteristics.
We carefully address potential endogeneity concerns by using 3 approaches.
The 1st approach is to estimate the LFO-volatility relationship using IV
regressions. Although there is no prior theory that pinpoints suitable instruments
for LFO, econometrically, any instrument needs to be highly correlated with LFO
(the relevance condition) and uncorrelated with the unexplained component of
volatility (the exclusion condition). To satisfy both conditions, we argue that the
best instruments are those related to the evolution of a firm’s ownership and con-
trol. This is because the ability of foreign investors to acquire large shareholdings
in emerging markets is highly dependent on a firm’s ownership structure develop-
ment path, which is also likely to be unrelated to contemporary volatility.
Our 1st instrument, therefore, is a measure of the type of original ultimate
controlling owner. To construct this variable, we trace the history of each sample
firm to identify how it was established. If the firm is currently owned by another
listed firm as part of a business group, we examine the history of its ultimate con-
trolling parent firm at the top of the ownership chain. We find that most listed
emerging market firms are established by a family/individual, a government, or
other widely held firms. Our 1st instrument is therefore constructed as an indicator
variable, which equals 1 if a sample firm was established by a family/individual
and was never nationalized in its history, and 0 otherwise. This instrument should
be highly (negatively) correlated with LFO because privatizations of government-
owned enterprises or divestments of subsidiaries from a domestic corporation are
often the main avenues for foreign investors to acquire significant stakes in emerg-
ing market firms,14 whereas domestic families (and entrepreneurs) are often much
14In a World Bank study, Sader (1995) documents that during the 1980s and early 1990s, govern-
ments of developing economies specifically targeted foreign investors in their privatization program
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more reluctant to relinquish or share control. As this instrument is constructed
based on historical information regarding owner identities extending far back to a
firm’s foundation, it is likely to be exogenous with respect to current volatility.
The 2nd instrument is based on the well-documented pattern that many
emerging market firms are part of a business group and controlled through a
pyramid structure (see Khanna and Yafeh (2007)). Similar to Masulis, Pham,
and Zein (2011), we measure the extent to which a sample firm is pyramid-
controlled as the number of layers (i.e., other listed firms) separating the firm from
its ultimate controlling owner, and use this as our 2nd instrument. This variable
should be highly correlated with LFO because the deviation of control rights from
cash-flow rights in a pyramid structure may create more incentives for the control-
ling shareholder to expropriate (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999)),
which deters foreign investments (Stulz (2005)). Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006)
also argue that a pyramid structure can create a financing advantage for member
firms, making them less dependent on foreign capital. Our pyramid-layer instru-
ment is unlikely to have a direct influence on a firm’s current volatility, as it is de-
termined by the evolution in the control structure linking it to the rest of the group.
We run 4 IV regressions of volatility on LFO using specifications similar to
those reported in Table 3. We include both instruments in the same estimation
because we believe that a combination of original owner identity and the use of
a pyramid structure would strongly discourage foreign investors or make it very
difficult for them to obtain large shareholdings in an emerging market firm. The
IV regression specifications are thus overidentified. Their results are reported in
Table 6 for volatility measured in 2002 (Panel A) and 2006 (Panel B).
In Table 6 we report several important test statistics related to our instru-
ments. First, on the relevance of the instruments, the high Shea (1997) partial-R2
statistics (in the range of 0.08 to 0.13) indicate that both instruments strongly
correlate with LFO. This is further supported by the Kleibergen and Paap (2006)
Wald statistics, which mostly exceed the highest recommended critical value.
Second, to test the exclusion condition, we report the Hansen (1982) J statis-
tics, which are statistically insignificant. This implies the null hypotheses that the
instruments can be excluded from the main equation and that the overidentify-
ing restrictions are valid cannot be rejected. Based on these tests, our instruments
appear to satisfy both the relevance and exclusion conditions.
Across the regression specifications reported in Table 6, our LFO measure is
consistently negatively related to stock return volatility at the conventional levels
of significance. It is also important to note that the inclusion of the instruments
does not substantially alter the significance of other control variables. In sum-
mary, these results support the claim that higher LFO leads to lower stock return
volatility in emerging markets.
Our 2nd method of addressing the endogeneity problem is to examine the re-
lationship between LFO and volatility using the 1st-difference regression model.
We reestimate the main regression models reported in Table 3, using changes in
volatility, LFO, and relevant control variables over the 2002–2006 period, rather
as a financial liberalization strategy. He reports that foreign investors participate in about 30% of the
privatization transactions in these periods and contribute to about 35% of the sales volume.
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TABLE 6
The Relationship between Volatility and LFO at the Firm Level
(instrumental variables regressions)
The dependent variable is the average of a logarithmic transformation of monthly squared returns. LFO5PCT is the aggre-
gate percentage ownership of foreign investors with a block (≥ 5%) shareholding. The instruments for LFO5PCT are i) the
dummy variable for the identity of the original owner of a ﬁrm, which equals 1 if the original owner is a domestic individ-
ual or family, and 0 otherwise; and ii) the number of pyramid layers between the ﬁrm and its ultimate controlling owner.
INVESTIBILITY is obtained from the S&P Emerging Markets database, which deﬁnes this variable as the proportion of the
issued shares (ranging from 0 to 1) that can be legally and practically held by foreign investors. DOMFIN (DOMNONFIN)
is the aggregate block shareholdings of domestic ﬁnancial institutions (all nonﬁnancial domestic entities). CROSSHOLD is
the percentage of issued shares of a sample ﬁrm held by other domestic corporations. LogMKTCAP is the average of the
monthly natural logarithm of market capitalization. TURNOVER is the average of the number of shares traded in a month
divided by the number of shares outstanding at the beginning of the month. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total
assets. LagVOL is the lagged dependent variable. All regressions include (but we do not report) industry dummy variables
and country ﬁxed effects. Cluster standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Dependent Variable Panel B. Dependent Variable
Is 2002 Volatility Is 2006 Volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LFO5PCT –1.102** –1.264* –0.663** –0.996*
(0.521) (0.765) (0.335) (0.595)
INVESTIBILITY 0.138 0.021 0.083 –0.015
(0.273) (0.221) (0.152) (0.126)
DOMFIN –0.460* –0.647* –0.410 –0.461
(0.263) (0.361) (0.302) (0.320)
CROSSHOLD 0.201 0.149
(0.161) (0.196)
DOMNONFIN –0.267 –0.031
(0.425) (0.268)
LogMKTCAP –0.061 –0.046 –0.100*** –0.086***
(0.044) (0.043) (0.033) (0.033)
TURNOVER 0.315 0.289 1.030*** 0.964***
(0.199) (0.205) (0.191) (0.224)
LEVERAGE 0.271*** 0.250*** 0.064 0.052
(0.078) (0.088) (0.058) (0.061)
LagVOL 0.273*** 0.272*** 0.258*** 0.255***
(0.042) (0.041) (0.048) (0.048)
Adjusted R2 0.132 0.125 0.148 0.140
Shea Partial R2 0.131 0.105 0.097 0.082
Kleibergen-Paap Wald stat. 33.325 32.933 27.636 13.255
Critical value 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93
Hansen J statistic 0.785 0.103 0.500 0.713
p-value 0.376 0.749 0.479 0.598
No. of obs. 1,364 1,364 1,300 1,300
than their levels.15 This model controls for unobservable time-invariant firm fac-
tors that may drive both LFO and volatility and that cannot be accounted for in a
standard cross-sectional regression model, such as the risk nature of a firm. It is
important to note that we do not examine ownership changes on a yearly basis,
as such changes are likely to be very small. Instead, we measure differences over
2 different years and select a time period long enough for there to be significant
and meaningful changes in ownership concentration. On average, LFO changes
by 5.8% over the period between 2002 and 2006. This is a significant average
change because for a large number of firms, there are actually no large foreign
15We thank the referee for the constructive suggestion on dealing with the endogeneity problem.
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shareholders at any time. Among the sample firms with LFO, the magnitude of
the average change in LFO increases to 13.8%.
Based on such time variations, we estimate this 1st-difference model across
the full sample, for the subsample with positive LFO, and finally for the subsam-
ple with only firms that have an increase (decrease) in LFO between 2002 and
2006. The results are reported in Table 7. From Panel A to Panel C, we find that
intertemporal changes in LFO are significantly related to corresponding changes
TABLE 7
The Relationship between Volatility and LFO at the Firm Level (1st-difference regression)
The dependent variable is the change in the volatility (the average of a logarithmic transformation of monthly squared
returns) from 2002 to 2006. All explanatory variables are changes (denoted by Δ) in the following. LFO5PCT is the ag-
gregate percentage ownership of foreign investors with a block (≥ 5%) shareholding. INVESTIBILITY is obtained from the
S&P Emerging Markets database, which deﬁnes this variable as the proportion of the issued shares (ranging from 0 to 1)
that can be legally and practically held by foreign investors. DOMFIN (DOMNONFIN) is the aggregate block shareholdings
of domestic ﬁnancial institutions (all nonﬁnancial domestic entities). CROSSHOLD is the percentage of issued shares of a
sample ﬁrm held by other domestic corporations. LogMKTCAP is the average of the monthly natural logarithm of market
capitalization. TURNOVER is the average of the number of shares traded in a month divided by the number of shares
outstanding at the beginning of the month. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. LagVOL is the lagged
dependent variable. All regressions include (but we do not report) industry dummy variables and country ﬁxed effects.
Cluster-adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
Panel B. Panel C. Panel D.
Subsample of Subsample of Subsample of
Panel A. Firms with Firms with Firms with
Full Sample LFO5PCT > 0 ΔLFO5PCT > 0 ΔLFO5PCT < 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ΔLFO5PCT –1.014*** –0.869*** –1.058*** –1.150*** –1.098*** –1.223*** –1.209 –1.383*
(0.250) (0.259) (0.242) (0.303) (0.277) (0.289) (0.941) (0.840)
ΔINVESTIBILITY –0.124 –0.035 –0.027 –0.018 0.071 0.082 –0.228 –0.210
(0.208) (0.202) (0.219) (0.193) (0.257) (0.196) (0.598) (0.568)
ΔDOMFIN 0.418 0.488 1.040 0.999 0.890 0.866 0.891 0.742
(0.394) (0.361) (0.939) (0.921) (0.930) (0.911) (1.764) (1.829)
ΔCROSSHOLD –0.300 –0.042 –0.066 –0.072
(0.244) (0.325) (0.453) (0.790)
ΔDOMNONFIN 0.274 –0.192 –0.304 –0.341
(0.203) (0.299) (0.340) (0.494)
ΔLogMKTCAP 0.012 0.005 –0.087 –0.088 0.003 0.001 –0.227 –0.222
(0.050) (0.050) (0.061) (0.061) (0.079) (0.078) (0.165) (0.167)
ΔTURNOVER 0.379 0.382 1.191*** 1.182*** 1.137*** 1.113*** 1.962*** 1.996***
(0.264) (0.266) (0.397) (0.394) (0.330) (0.342) (0.586) (0.576)
ΔLEVERAGE 0.146 0.151 –0.127 –0.130 0.560* 0.536* –0.457 –0.440
(0.164) (0.166) (0.231) (0.228) (0.307) (0.298) (0.349) (0.361)
ΔLagVOL 0.131*** 0.132*** 0.130* 0.129* 0.095 0.092 0.152 0.165*
(0.039) (0.038) (0.070) (0.069) (0.076) (0.074) (0.109) (0.097)
Adjusted R2 0.220 0.220 0.320 0.321 0.362 0.364 0.363 0.364
No. of obs. 1,261 1,261 540 540 312 312 169 169
in volatility. The negative relationship still holds, but the level of significance be-
comes weaker, as shown in Panel D. One possible reason is that the number of
observations used in Panel D is substantially smaller than those in other panels.
Overall, the volatility-reduction effect of LFO is unlikely to be driven by unob-
servable time-invariant firm characteristics.
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Finally, we employ an event study to further clarify the causality direction
in the relationship between LFO and volatility. We focus on the sample firms
reporting transactions involving large foreign shareholders to establish whether
volatility changes only after such transactions. This exercise uses data sources
other than our ownership database. In particular, we collect announcements of
large block purchases or sales (involving more than 5% of the issued shares)
involving both foreign and domestic investors as counterparties from Securities
Data Company (SDC) Platinum (from Thomson Financial Reuters) and Zephyr
(from Bureau Van Dijk). These data sources are further supplemented by man-
ual searches of financial news reported in the Factiva database. While LFO can
change for many different reasons (e.g., share issue participation, stock market
trading, and so on), we find only 88 event firms in our sample for which LFO
changes due to events of large block purchases/sales and for which the transac-
tion dates can be ascertained from the previous data sources.
We calculate volatility for preevent periods of up to 3 years, ending 6 months
before the 1st announcement of a transaction, and for corresponding postevent pe-
riods of up to 3 years, starting from 6 months after the announcement date. The
6-month periods before and after each event are excluded from the volatility mea-
sures so that they do not capture potential excess volatility generated by rumors of
an impending transaction or by arbitrage activity occurring after the transaction.
For each event firm, we also calculate the same volatility measures of a control
set, consisting of all firms in the same market that do not report any changes in
LFO, and report the averages over the same matched calendar periods.16
The results are reported in Table 8. For large block purchases by foreign
investors (see Panel A), we find that volatility measures indeed decline following
each transaction. Further, the target firm has similar volatility to its control set
before the transaction, but after the transaction, its volatility is significantly lower
than that of its control set. This implies that foreign block purchases do not seem
to be driven by ex ante volatility changes. However, such transactions generate ex
post declines in volatility. We also find that the average volatility of event firms
increases relative to that of control firms following large block sales by foreign
investors (see Panel B), but the levels of significance of our tests are constrained
by the small sample size (17 transactions). In Panel C, we consider all transactions
and compare volatility observed in low-LFO periods (before a purchase and after
a sale) with that observed in high LFO-periods (after a purchase and before a
sale). Again, we find that volatility is always lower in the latter periods and that
volatility changes surrounding a transaction for an event firm are also significantly
larger than contemporaneous volatility changes of its control firms.
It is unlikely that the previous findings arise simply because foreign investors
are able to forecast long-term volatility better than domestic investors, so that
the former can target firms facing declining future volatility or divest from firms
16Note that due to the size and liquidity selection criteria imposed by the S&P Emerging Markets
database, our control firms are quite similar to the event firms. As a robustness check, we also form
a set of 1-to-1 matched firms (by finding the firm in the same industry with the closest market capi-
talization, or if not possible, the firm in the same market with the closest market capitalization). This
alternative control set produces similar results.
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TABLE 8
The Relationship between Volatility and LFO at the Firm Level:
Study of Events of Large Block Acquisitions and Disposals by Foreign Investors
Volatility for a particular period is measured as the average of a logarithmic transformation of monthly squared returns. The
event sample consists of events of acquisitions (Panel A of Table 8) and disposals (Panel B) by foreign investors of large
block of shares (>5%) in our sample ﬁrms of emerging markets, as reported by SDC Platinum, Zephyr, and/or Factiva.
Panel A (Panel B) compares volatility during Year –3, Year –2, and Year –1 relative to the date that is 6 months before the
announcement of a purchase (sale) to volatility during Year +1, Year +2, and Year +3 relative to the date that is 6 months
after the announcement. Panel C combines both acquisition and disposal events into one sample, and compares volatility
between periods with low LFO (i.e., before a block purchase or after a block sale by a foreign investor) and periods with
high LFO (i.e., after a block purchase or before a block sale by a foreign investor). In this panel, volatility is also measured
over cumulative periods of 1, 2, and 3 years surrounding each event, excluding 6 months surrounding the event. The same
volatility measures calculated over matched calendar periods are also reported for sample ﬁrms in the same country that
do not report any large block transfers involving foreign investors (the control sample). The differences in volatility between
the event sample and the control sample, and the t-statistics associated with these differences are reported in the last
2 columns. ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
t-Test of
Average Volatility – Average Volatility – Difference Difference
Event Sample (1) Control Sample (2) (1) – (2) (1) – (2)
Panel A. Volatility Before and After Large Block Purchases by Foreign Investors (N = 71)
Year –3 3.217 3.368 −0.151 1.203
Year –2 3.621 3.409 0.212 1.613
Year –1 3.561 3.507 0.053 0.417
Year +1 2.724 3.051 −0.327 −2.189**
Year +2 2.712 3.090 −0.378 −2.711**
Year +3 3.039 3.438 −0.398 −3.240***
Panel B. Volatility Before and After Large Block Sales by Foreign Investors (N = 17)
Year –3 3.684 3.714 −0.030 −0.122
Year –2 3.846 3.507 0.339 2.106**
Year –1 3.625 3.432 0.192 0.912
Year +1 3.436 3.067 0.368 2.201**
Year +2 3.232 3.079 0.153 0.638
Year +3 4.261 3.588 0.672 1.930*
Panel C. Comparison of Volatility Surrounding both Purchases and Sales (N = 88)
1-year low LFO 3.257 3.325 –0.039 −0.356
1-year high LFO 2.805 3.132 –0.317 −2.024**
Low vs. high t-test 2.850** 3.388*** 1.699*
2-year low LFO 3.312 3.258 0.097 1.080
2-year high LFO 2.822 3.151 –0.239 −2.352**
Low vs. high t-test 3.139** 1.954* 3.214***
3-year low LFO 3.431 3.347 0.088 1.009
3-year high LFO 2.943 3.227 –0.287 −2.956**
Low vs. high t-test 4.324*** 2.058** 3.721***
facing increasing volatility at prices favorable to them. Such foresight is not sup-
ported by existing theory and evidence that it is foreign investors who generally
face information disadvantages vis-a`-vis domestic investors (French and Poterba
(1991), Kang and Stulz (1997), Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001), and Portes
and Rey (2005)). Therefore, evidence from our event study suggests that the ob-
served volatility-reduction effect is a causal outcome of large foreign shareholder
participation.17
Overall, we subject our baseline regression results regarding a negative rela-
tionship between LFO and volatility to a battery of robustness checks to control
for endogeneity. All of these analyses consistently suggest that endogeneity is
17A closer look at the Factiva news announcements associated with these block transactions shows
that in close to 80% of the transactions, one of the counterparties is a major domestic company op-
erating in the same industry sector as the target firm, which is unlikely to be at an informational
disadvantage.
1150 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
unlikely to be the driving factor behind our main findings. We do not rule out that
foreign investors may simply pick up low-risk firms, as documented by Kang and
Stulz (1997), but our evidence strongly suggests that large foreign shareholders
do generate important volatility-reduction benefits for their targets.
D. Volatility Impact of Large Foreign Shareholders in Different
Governance Environments
Our earlier findings imply that large foreign shareholders have an incentive
to reduce stock return volatility due to the size of their shareholdings and possibly
other physical (or intangible) investments beyond their financial interests. This
is also consistent with the broader interpretation that certain large foreign share-
holders may have a monitoring role in emerging markets. However, the means by
which foreign shareholders can exert their influence on local managers may not
always be available or may differ across investment environments. In this section,
we consider whether the stabilizing role of large foreign shareholders is related
to their monitoring activities. Our hypothesis is that if the relationship between
LFO and volatility reflects large foreign shareholder monitoring, then it is likely
to be more observable in a governance environment that provides more support
for monitoring activities.
To test this hypothesis, we reexamine the LFO-volatility relationship across
different country-level governance environments, using several classifications.
First, we rank countries according to the Financial Disclosure index, obtained
from the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global Competitiveness Report, which
measures the ability to access sufficient, accurate, and timely corporate informa-
tion by shareholders. Second, we classify countries according to the anti-director
rights index as employed in La Porta et al. (1999), which measures the degree
of minority shareholder protection. This index was updated to 2002 by Pagano
and Volpin (2005) and to 2005 by Spamann (2010). Last, we use an index that
measures the extent to which legal rights are effectively enforced in a country,
constructed as the principal component aggregation of 3 World Bank indicators
(see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2004)): the rule of law, regulatory qual-
ity, and the control of corruption. With our 3 governance indices, a higher score
indicates a better governance environment, which offers greater support for mon-
itoring activity. For each of the 3 alternative indices, we rerun our baseline re-
gression model for the subsample of firms in countries with below-median index
values and again for those with above-median index values. When the regression
model is estimated using 2002 (2006) data, we use the indices as measured in
2001 (2005).
The regression results are reported in Table 9. Regardless of governance
classification methods, we find that the corporate governance environment ap-
pears to influence the strength of the relationship between LFO and stock re-
turn volatility. For the 2002 regressions, the coefficients of LFO5PCT are always
statistically significant in most “High” governance score columns and are less
significant or insignificant in “Low” governance score columns. For the 2006 re-
gressions, the magnitudes of the coefficients of LFO are consistently higher in
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TABLE 9
The Firm-Level Relationship between LFO and Volatility
in Different Governance Environments
The dependent variable is the average of a logarithmic transformation of monthly squared returns. The results are based
upon subsamples classiﬁed according to the Financial Disclosure index obtained from the Global Competitiveness Report,
the La Porta et al. (1999) index (excluding Bahrain and Oman due to missing index value), and the enforcement index
constructed using the World Bank’s governance indicators. For each of the indices, the “high” (or “low”) group comprises
ﬁrms from countries with above (or below) median index value. LFO5PCT is the aggregate percentage ownership of foreign
block (≥ 5%) shareholdings. INVESTIBILITY is the proportion of the issued shares (ranging from 0 to 1) that can be legally
and practically held by foreign investors, as obtained from the S&P Emerging Markets database. DOMFIN (DOMNONFIN)
is the aggregate block shareholdings of domestic ﬁnancial institutions (all nonﬁnancial domestic entities). CROSSHOLD is
the percentage of issued shares of a sample ﬁrm held by other domestic corporations. LogMKTCAP is the average of the
monthly natural logarithm of market capitalization. TURNOVER is the average of the number of shares traded in a month
divided by the number of shares outstanding at the beginning of the month. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total
assets. LagVOL is the lagged dependent variable. All regressions include (but do not report) industry dummy variables
and country ﬁxed effects. Cluster-adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
WEF Financial Anti-Director World Bank
Disclosure Index Rights Index Enforcement Index
Low High Low High Low High
Panel A. Dependent Variable Is 2002 Volatility
LFO5PCT –0.138 –0.586** –0.205 –0.558** –0.412* –0.392**
(0.237) (0.202) (0.203) (0.215) (0.242) (0.157)
INVESTIBILITY –0.332 0.545*** –0.141 0.390** –0.221 0.447**
(0.282) (0.153) (0.340) (0.150) (0.285) (0.206)
DOMFIN 0.283 –0.492 0.561 –0.589* –0.022 –0.330
(0.597) (0.357) (0.880) (0.313) (0.813) (0.336)
CROSSHOLD –0.294 0.506*** 0.053 0.250 0.147 0.051
(0.190) (0.145) (0.195) (0.224) (0.238) (0.224)
LogMKTCAP 0.035 –0.154*** –0.021 –0.130*** 0.008 –0.123***
(0.073) (0.029) (0.076) (0.034) (0.070) (0.033)
TURNOVER 3.119** 0.226 0.149 0.426*** 0.221 0.553***
(1.090) (0.148) (0.206) (0.068) (0.204) (0.164)
LEVERAGE 0.107 0.548*** 0.206** 0.576*** 0.218*** 0.415**
(0.107) (0.132) (0.073) (0.180) (0.058) (0.170)
LagVOL 0.238*** 0.316*** 0.202*** 0.352*** 0.230*** 0.350***
(0.068) (0.039) (0.050) (0.041) (0.038) (0.052)
Adjusted R2 0.354 0.406 0.267 0.472 0.307 0.463
No. of obs. 522 842 649 693 663 701
Panel B. Dependent Variable Is 2006 Volatility
LFO5PCT –0.507** –0.569*** –0.430* –0.610*** –0.445** –0.640***
(0.170) (0.173) (0.202) (0.164) (0.155) (0.175)
INVESTIBILITY 0.052 0.005 0.171 –0.040 0.011 0.066
(0.240) (0.171) (0.263) (0.165) (0.225) (0.186)
DOMFIN 0.048 –0.603 0.256 –0.615 –0.943 –0.272
(0.477) (0.348) (0.462) (0.354) (0.886) (0.279)
CROSSHOLD 0.346 –0.131 0.529 –0.196 0.151 0.059
(0.306) (0.196) (0.321) (0.191) (0.318) (0.186)
LogMKTCAP –0.017 –0.128*** –0.016 –0.130*** –0.045 –0.120***
(0.050) (0.032) (0.037) (0.032) (0.048) (0.036)
TURNOVER 1.039*** 0.841*** 1.480*** 0.793*** 1.089*** 0.830***
(0.289) (0.196) (0.153) (0.138) (0.297) (0.191)
LEVERAGE 0.083* 0.070 0.056 0.097 0.070 0.064
(0.044) (0.149) (0.058) (0.151) (0.040) (0.147)
LagVOL 0.202*** 0.277*** 0.225*** 0.258*** 0.205*** 0.284***
(0.053) (0.064) (0.053) (0.064) (0.054) (0.068)
Adjusted R2 0.174 0.352 0.184 0.336 0.156 0.359
No. of obs. 486 814 421 860 518 782
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the “High” groups than in the “Low” groups.18 In summary, consistent with our
earlier prediction, the stabilizing effect of large foreign shareholdings appears to
be more significant in emerging markets with strong support for shareholder mon-
itoring than in those with weak support.
IV. Conclusion
The experience of past financial crises in emerging economies has raised
concerns about the possible destabilizing impact of foreign capital flows into and
out of local stock markets. Much of the debate focuses on the effect of foreign
investments on firm-level stock return volatility. This issue remains unsolved, as
most of the existing studies in the stock market liberalization literature not only
lack an accurate measure of foreign ownership but also fail to account for the
heterogeneity among foreign investors.
This paper constructs a firm-level measure of LFO in emerging stock mar-
kets. We document a negative relationship between this measure and stock return
volatility. After controlling for potential endogeneity and major domestic own-
ership, our results suggest a stabilizing, rather than destabilizing, role of large
foreign shareholders in emerging stock markets. We also demonstrate that our
measure of LFO differs substantially from the investibility index that has been
widely used in the literature.
Two possible economic channels are offered toward understanding the stabi-
lizing effect of large foreign shareholders. First, drawing from a well-established
point in the FDI literature, we argue that a large shareholding represents a long-
term commitment from the foreign investor, who may provide not just mone-
tary capital but also resources, technology, and training of human capital. Unlike
portfolio investors, large foreign shareholders do not come and go quickly. This
explanation is supported by evidence that the documented stabilizing effect is
most observable for nonfinancial large foreign shareholders. Second, we argue
that large foreign shareholders reduce volatility by playing a significant moni-
toring role in the local firms they invested in. Consistent with this argument, we
find that the negative relationship between LFO and volatility is more observable
in countries that support shareholder monitoring. Overall, our results imply that
certain foreign investors can make positive contributions to domestic firms, but
such benefits of market liberalization can be constrained by failure to improve the
underlying legal and governance institutions in a host country.
An important contribution of this study is to examine, in a cross-country
context, a new measure of foreign ownership that represents the actual presence
of large foreign investors in emerging markets. In contrast, most previous stud-
ies only focus on the openness of foreign investment regulations by measuring
the prospect of foreign investor presence. Our results therefore not only add to
18In an alternative robustness check, we find that the LFO variable representing investors from
developed markets generates a more significant volatility-reduction effect than the LFO variable rep-
resenting investors from emerging markets. Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar (2010) also document that
developed-economy firms experience greater positive returns upon acquiring emerging-economy firms
than emerging-economy acquirers. Similar to our interpretation, they attribute their results to the su-
perior governance and monitoring attributes of foreign shareholders.
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existing evidence on the impact of stock market liberalization but also highlight
the importance of recognizing the heterogeneity among foreign investors. This
direction of analysis is advocated by Stiglitz ((2004) p. 60), who points out that
“the analysis would have been greatly enriched if more effort had been put into
parsing out the effects of different kinds of capital flows.” We hope that our re-
sults might encourage more research into foreign investor heterogeneity to further
clarify their different contributions to local stock markets.
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